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In this chapter we will show how the demographic transition, in its broadest sense a universal 
phenomenon
3
, now encompasses the Arab (and Muslim) world. Beyond the stage of descriptive 
demography, we would like to pay attention to the elements of politics related to the demographic 
transition, particularly with regard to the Arab Spring, which started in late 2010. The connections we 
will draw between education, demography and politics are, in itself, not completely new. In fact, the 
British historian Lawrence Stone (1969) established already a link between education and revolution 
in an article published one year after the May Revolution of 1968.
4
 His research suggests that once 
populations reach the threshold, in which 50% of their young males are literate, political trouble  
arises. The link between increased levels of education and social disruption can also be found in other 
regions, such as the Arab world today, where young people are, from a demographic point of view, the 
dominant group in the population and the driving force behind protests and revolution.  
In this contribution,  we will investigate how a youth bulge is present all over the North Africa 
and the Middle East, from Morocco to Iran. The presence of this youth bulges increases the risks for 
violence and revolution in this world region. However, disruption will not last forever. On the basis of 
demographic indicators, it is possible to predict a more serene future and a process of convergence 
with the Western world in terms of political development. This process will form the onset of an era in 
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which the youth bulge is declining, while the group of aged persons is still relatively small. The 
economic advantages of this new demographic stage will be immense for the Arab and Muslim world. 
Yet, the most promising outcomes might be that of a political nature, as we will show in this chapter. 
 
6.1 From the Demographic to the Democratic Revolution 
Since December 2010, the speed, abruptness and scope of events in North Africa and the Middle East 
have taken everyone by surprise. However, the way that the events in the Arab World were perceived 
differs substantially from one world region to another. While the European and Arab media were 
initially very optimistic about the potential outcomes, the Israeli media, seem to have perceived the 
Arab Spring, at first, as a degenerative development with many potential negative outcomes. Ehud 
Barak, the Israeli Minister of Defense, went so far as to qualify ‘that tsunami of events’ as a kind of 
intifadas (Lister & Flower 2011).  
Revolutionary events can be perceived as inevitable. The revolutionary processes that took 
place in early modern England and then burgeoned in France towards the end of the Ancien regime, 
before spreading throughout Europe and the world during the nineteenth and twentieth century, have 
also reached the Arab countries. For the past four decades, depending on their level of advancement, 
the Arab countries have been experiencing cultural, demographic and anthropological transformations, 
as well as changes in family systems, which resemble the changes that Europe has gone through since 
the English (1640-1660) and French Revolutions (1789-1793). Contrary to many essentialist or 
culturalist views, as expressed by Bernard Lewis (1990; 1993; 2001), Samuel Huntington (1993; 
1996) and others, the Arab world is no exception.
5
 Its development is not intrinsically different from 
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observed evolutions in other human societies. Conversely, the Arab countries are on the road towards 
modernity and stability, a road which is being paved by demographic and democratic revolutions.     
 
6.1.1 Education at the root of the transformations 
The multiple transitions that the Arab countries are going through nowadays were first and foremost 
triggered by access to education for boys, and later on, for girls. While the youth in the Arab world 
were almost completely illiterate a few decades ago, today most young people in North Africa and the 
Middle East are able to read and write by the ages of 20 to 24 (see graph 6.1). Several effects of this 
transformation are well-known and well-studied, such as the link between education and fertility 
decrease (Courbage 2009; Fargues 1988; Tabutin & Schoumaker 2005; Zuryak 1977). It is important 
to recall, that at the root of modernization processes and the demographic transition, gaining the ability 
to read, and especially to write, is an essential step for the individuation of the human being and the 
acquisition of autonomy (Cipolla 1969; Furet & Ouzouf 1977). Nevertheless, a holistic vision is still 
missing, linking the multiple stages of increased education to revolution. 
 
- Graph 6.1 about here - 
 
6.1.2 Demographic metamorphosis and mental change 
Even though fertility has been the most significant and paramount factor that was affected by 
education, education also triggered mortality decrease. This demographic shift can be dated back to the 
seventeenth century when advances in medicine contributed also to decreasing mortality rates in 
Europe, which further advanced fertility decrease (Livi-Bacci 2012). In the developing world, the 
connection remains very clear, even still today. Infants and children of higher educated parents, and 
especially of higher educated mothers, have lower odds of passing away prematurely (Caldwell 1979; 
Caldwell & McDonald 1982; Cochrane 1986).  
Similarly, but with some historical delay, Arab fertility would not have fallen if mortality had 
not taken the lead, pushing life expectancy from 40 years in the 1950’s to over 75 years today. This 
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was to a large degree the result of a large reduction in infant and child mortality. Because more 
children survived, parents started to feel an incentive to limit the number of offspring. On the macro-
level, mortality decline gave rise to strong population growth, which sooner or later was perceived as 
an obstacle to future (economic) development (Winckler 1998).  
The mortality reduction was not only spectacular by its demographic effects, but also by its 
psychological implications. Arab populations are very often – hastily – characterized as fatalistic (even 
by themselves) (Moughrabi 1978; Patai 1973), and Arabic language is indeed filled with fatalistic 
expressions (Farghal 1993). Fatalism might have been rooted in the everyday character, death, 
embraced in past Arab societies. It simply was a banal phenomenon in every corner. The mortality 
decrease then became akin to a psychological revolution, reshaping the psyche of populations moving 
away from a fatalistic attitude and towards a more rationalized, agency-based mentality, in which 
people themselves (instead of god, fate and/ or predestination) realize that they influence the course of 
history.   
In line with this trend towards more agency, people in North Africa and the Middle East 
started to control their own fertility like European populations had begun to do from the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
century on. Thus, fertility in North Africa and the Middle East fell from 7.5 children per woman on 
average in the period before the fertility transition, to less than 3 today, with several countries near or 
below replacement level (2.1). Hence, today Iran’s fertility rate (1.8) is lower than that in Scandinavia; 
in Lebanon where 60% of the population is Muslim, the fertility rate (1.6) is lower than in Belgium 
(1.8); and Tunisia (2.05), Morocco (2.19) and Turkey (2.10) are only slightly above the TFR in France 
(see Graph 6.2). 
  
- Graph 6.2 about here - 
 
 
The progress in education - especially female education - has caused a delay in the age at first marriage 
and has increased the spread of contraception (Courbage 2009), to where there are basically no 
theological obstacles for Muslims and for large groups of Arab Christians (Bowen 1981; Esposito 
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2002). This spurred the decrease in fertility down to a low European average of 2 children, in the most 
advanced parts of the region like North Africa, Lebanon (not only among the Christians but also the 
Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites alike), Turkey and Iran (Courbage & Fargues 1997; Courbage 2009). 
 
6.1.3 Towards a more open and egalitarian society 
Another core aspect of societal change related to the demographic transition concerns marriage. 
Matrimony is no longer the sacred religious and social obligation that it used to be. In Morocco, for 
example, 42% of men and 33% of women aged between 30-34 years (some by personal choice) were 
still single in 2010. In Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Lebanon the singulate mean age at marriage 
(SMAM) for women approaches or exceeds thirty years now, almost double of what it was in the 
1960’s (Courbage & Todd 2011). But not only the timing and intensity of marriage have decreased, 
the very nature of marriage itself has changed as well. The occurrence of endogamy or the so called 
“Arab marriage”, i.e. marital unions between family members, has been cut by half. Going beyond 
mere demographic calculations, we would like to underscore that when a society shifts from 
endogamic to exogamic marriages, like in Morocco for example, where marriage with relatives has 
fallen from 30% to 15% between 1995 and 2010, society becomes more open.  
Furthermore, patriarchal social structures and mentalities no longer seem to resist 
demographic changes, which in turn weakens the very basis of traditional patriarchal system. In 
Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey and in some areas of Syria (e.g. the Alawite, Druze, Ismaili 
populated provinces) the TFR is now close to, or below, two children. As a consequence, the 
probability of not having at least one son greatly increases as fertility continues to decline (see graph 
6.3). Where the risk of not having at least one son was negligible or low when the TFR was above 
four children, it has become significant in those countries where the TFR has approached two. Thus 
25% of the couples in the Maghreb, Lebanon, Turkey or Iran and in coastal and mountainous Syria 
today accept the possibility of having only two daughters without a male heir, apparently in 
contradiction with the teachings of Islam, or more profoundly, with the deeply rooted age-old 
patriarchal ideology (Courbage & Todd 2011).  
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- Graph 6.3 about here - 
 
Finally, gender roles are subject to change due to the demographic transition. First, because women 
devote less of their time to reproductive tasks and have more opportunities to earn an independent 
living. Second, because ages at marriage have increased faster among females than among males, the 
age-gap between husbands and their wives has narrowed. Third,  legal change in several Arab 
countries led to a situation in which women have more rights than was previously the case. All these 
trends have increased the bargaining power of women (Fargues 2005). Released from traditional role 
patterns, Arab women (Iranians also) have burst onto the scene during the Arab Spring, from 
Casablanca to Dera’a and even in remote Sana’a. Purdah or female seclusion seems to have come to 
an end. As a result of successful educational and demographic transitions, Arab societies are being 
reshuffled, and new roles for women are being created. This is especially proven by women’s entry to 
secondary and higher education. In secondary education, net enrolment ratios are now higher for girls 
than for boys in a majority of the Arab countries, from Algeria (68/65) to Palestine (87/82), including 
the Arabian Peninsula and its emirates: Kuwait (92/88). Even more impressive is the enrolment of 
girls in universities, with the surprising result that in a majority of Arab countries, girls are now better 
educated than boys (see graph 6.4). These figures might soon influence employment, political, media 
and other spheres of Arab society. 
 
- Graph 6.4 about here - 
 
Going a step further, we claim that the aforementioned elements of societal openness might be 
conducive to revolt, especially when the population is governed by autocrats as is the case almost 
everywhere in the Arab region. Thus we would argue that a subtle combination of demographic 
changes, the inter-connectedness of mass education, mortality collapse, and an increasing choice in 
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marriage and fertility, might well act behind the scenes of rebellion against abject living conditions 
and absence of freedom. 
 
6.1.4 Ambivalent effects of education and contraception 
 
There is a hidden face to education. Education, as well as contraception, are ambivalent factors with 
simultaneously positive and negative consequences. From the philosophers of the Enlightenment until 
Emile Durkheim, only the positive consequences of the acquisition of education for males and females 
were considered, e.g. that fertility decline is indispensable for economic progress. However, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, the dark side of modernization was also emphasized: Due to higher levels of 
education, there was an increase of suicide. By the same token, learning to read and write made 
individuals, and the masses, more mindful of their circumstances, and cultural progress might well 
sow the seeds of psychological destabilization. Concretely, we observe in Arab societies where 
literacy is rising that: 
 Sons can read and write while their fathers, who still hold absolute power in patriarchal 
societies, cannot;  
 Sisters are getting educated, as much as, or more than their brothers; 
 Wives become as educated as (and sometimes more than) their husbands;  
 The spread of birth control (a phenomenon that follows literacy) weakens or eliminates the 
traditional domination of men over women. 
 
Thus, universal education might imply a direct destabilization of relations of authority in the family 
(Fargues 2005). These disruptions, in turn, might contribute to a psychological disorientation in 
society. Indirectly, contraception can have the same influence. The increasing use of contraception is a 
welcomed development, since limiting the number of children allows parents to invest more resources 
and attention in each child, who is then better fed and educated, receives better medical treatment and 
more affection. Parenting in a smaller family, particularly with regard to father-mother interactions, 
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becomes more democratic, freer, which can have an overall positive impact on society and governance. 
On the other side, a household in which an illiterate father wields authority over educated children with 
access to knowledge beyond the parents’ reach – especially in a patriarchal society – may prove an 
explosive combination. 
We may conclude that women’s education is a destabilizing factor for society at first, as is the 
growing practice of birth control. The psychological tension of this change (“who will guarantee that 
the men will not be cheated on?”) cannot be underestimated, especially in such societies where 
remnants of patriarchy have not completely disappeared. A vivid illustration of the link between sexual 
anxiety and political activism (in this case Islamist terrorism for a Kashmiri) may be found in Salman’s 
Rushdie (2005) novel, Shalimar the clown.  
 
6.1.5 Secularization: a pre-condition to the demographic transition? 
 
Besides the above described and well-known factors related to the demographic transition, we would 
now like to discuss the influence of secularization dynamics on fertility. A return to history shows 
that the secularization of individuals followed the emergence of education across the various strata of 
European society, although at varying tempos. 
France, where fertility started to decrease by the second half of the eighteenth century, was 
the most precocious in this regard. By means of coitus interruptus and a sort of primitive condom 
made out of animals’ intestines, French women went against the explicit teachings of the Church by 
actively curtailing their reproduction. On trompe la nature jusque dans les campagnes, lamented a 
Catholic priest of Ile-de-France (Ariès 1971). The rest of Europe underwent the same processes of 
secularization a century later , where the fertility transition was delayed, even though most of these 
countries had higher literacy rates than France. 
 
Against all odds, Arab societies, which have undergone an exceptionally fast fertility transition, are 
also experiencing this same process of secularization. But how to measure it? Surveys on attitudes 
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about secularization are very rare, and still somewhat taboo in most Arab countries. Only in Morocco, 
officially one of the most conservative Arab countries in religious matters, where the King is at the 
same time “A Commander of the Faithful”, these types of surveys could be taken (El Ayadi, Rachik 
& Tozy 2006). Those surveys demonstrate that, contrary to stereotypes and preconceived ideas, 
religious practice is receding among the younger generations, as only 47% (36% among young males 
and 59% among young females) claim to be religiously minded. 
 
The degree of religiosity has a clear impact on the act of voluntarily limiting the number of children. 
Contraception, either for European Christians or Arab Muslims, implies that they start to feel solely 
responsible for their reproduction and that “divine intervention” is no longer considered the genesis of 
procreation. Individuals understand their new meaning: to give life, without being dictated by the 
family, the tribe or by any political or religious power. Empirical data, even if limited, help to illustrate 
this major shift in attitudes. Whereas some forty years ago when the first surveys on the attitudes 
toward procreation in the Arab world were taken, an important number of women answered the 
question “what is your ideal number of children?” with non-numerical responses, like: “It is God’s 
will”, “I don’t believe in spacing births, it is God who decides…” etc., today such non-numerical 
responses have almost completely disappeared from the surveys. 
 
When we discuss a process like secularization, it is important to note that it weighs heavily on the 
relations between different cultural regions. Contrary to many alarmists who decry a “clash of 
civilizations,” the Arab and Muslim worlds, in general, and more peculiarly, North Africa are now 
undergoing secularization. Secularization, however, should not be equated with either atheism or 
even agnosticism. Rather, it means that an individual can be totally secular in one’s daily behaviour, 
– notably for the ability to give life - while he or she at the same time goes to church, to the mosque, 
or to the synagogue. There is no radical contradiction. Arab societies are witnessing a phenomenon of 
“disenchantment of the world”, in the sense used by Max Weber, which occurred in the West two 
centuries ago. 
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Hence, contrary to the line of reasoning of the essentialists, the Arab world is currently experiencing a 
demographic transformation, that is also affected by increased secularization. It might look ironic, even 
provocative, to raise this issue of secularization at a time when the Islamist parties are accumulating 
electoral victories one after the other, from Ennahda in Tunisia to the Parti Justice et Démocratie 
(PJD) in Morocco in 2011, and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in Egypt in 2012 and their 
emergence elsewhere (Libya, Syria and Yemen). However, these victories of Islamists may be only of 
temporary nature, as Mohamed Morsi is, for example, already dethroned and the Muslim brotherhood 
in Egypt has been banned (again). The temporary resurgence of Islamist regimes can best be 
understood by taking into account the fact that most Arabs have only known the worst side of secular 
powers, autocrats and despots, with the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties, or in a milder form Ben Ali in 
Tunisia, Qaddahfi in Libya or Mubarak in Egypt and Ali Abdallah Saleh in Yemen. Moreover, the 
French revolution and the 1848 revolution did not immediately lead to the instalment of stable 
democratic governments in Europe. After the French revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte reigned with an 
iron fist over France and larger parts of Europe. In 1848, his nephew became democratically elected, 
but he managed to quickly overthrow the democratic institutions before next elections were organized. 
As a result of his successful coup d’état, France turned once again into an empire.  
 
6.2 A Democratic Revolution or Chaos 
6.2.1 Democracy or Islamist chaos? 
There is no need to explain the violence in the Arab countries as a particular brand of Islam. It should 
be enough to recall the suddenness of the demographic transition within these countries compared to 
the one century it required in Europe, as exemplified in a fertility drop from 7.5 to less than three or 
two in a matter of four decades. This does not mean, however, that the Arab countries might not still 
be living in a state of disorientation, because of the sudden change of mentalities associated with rising 
literacy and the interconnected transitions related to male and female literacy and the use of 
contraception, and fertility decrease. Moreover many non-Muslim countries which are entering the key 
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stages of literacy and birth control today, also encounter massive political disruption, like Rwanda, 
Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Sri Lanka, Haiti... to name but just a few. 
 
 Researchers from the North, as well as from the South, and also most media, are mistaken 
when they present these crises as a regressive phenomenon, when they could also be defined as crises 
of the transition to modernization that disorient people and destabilize political regimes. It is therefore 
curious that, instead of looking at its positive and encouraging trends, researchers only seem to view 
the negative aspects of the changing Arab demography. In this regard, some recent analyses have 
focused on the demography of the Arab or Muslim world as a potential cause for increased 
radicalization and destabilization; like for instance, the strategic report “Towards a Grand Strategy for 
an Uncertain World,” written by retired NATO generals and high ranking officers (Naumann, et al. 
2005). Their assessment suggests that the Arab and Muslim countries constitute the world’s most 
volatile area because of their “youth bulge”, a demographic explosion that  increases uncertainty and 
favours the easy spread of political fanaticism and radical Islam. 
 
6.2.2 The view from the youth bulge 
 
The “youth bulge” is a concept coined by political scientists, notably G. Fuller (1995), J. Goldstone 
(1991) and G. Heinsohn (2003; 2006; 2007). In a first phase of the demographic transition, the size 
and share of the more turbulent segments in the population, the youth, increases. This youth-bulge is 
usually measured as the increase of the 15 to 24 years old, in relation to the total population or to the 
“mature” segment of the population aged 25-64 years (Courbage 1997). The measure in itself only 
counts a mechanical effect in the whole sequence of the demographic transition: Mortality decline and 
fertility deceleration (or sometimes increasing and then declining fertility) contribute to the impressive 
reshaping of the age-structure of a population. According to the burgeoning literature on this subject, 
an excess of young adult males in a population leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, as “third and 
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fourth sons” (within the same family) find no prestigious positions in their existing societies. 
Therefore, these ‘lost sons’ rationalize their impetus to compete with religion and political ideology.  
 
Looking as far back in time as the ancient Greek wars, a strong match can be found between the 
frequency of violent outbreaks (from war to terrorism) and the ratio of a young male population to its 
more mature segments in society. Heinsohn (2003; 2007) goes as far as to view most historical periods 
of social unrest and most genocides as the by-products of demographic youth bulges: European 
colonialism, fascism and more recently the on-going conflicts in Darfour, Afghanistan, 
Palestine/Israel, etc. Hence, “Age composition must be considered as a major coefficient in the 
incidence of violent behaviour”(Moller 1968: 255).  
For Samuel Huntington, demography is a major determinant in the clash of civilizations
6
, 
especially between the Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations: “Population growth in Muslim countries 
and particularly the expansion of the 15-24 years, provides recruitment for fundamentalism, 
insurgency and migration. Economic growth strengthens Asian governments, demographic growth 
threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies” (Huntington 1996:103). For Huntington 
there is a direct connection with the increasing level of education: “Islamist activists include a 
disproportionately large number of the best educated and most intelligent young people in their 
respective populations, including doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists…”(Huntington 1996: 113). 
 
Many explanations were given to explain the reason why young people, Arab or otherwise, are more 
inclined to gravitate toward violence than mature-aged persons. One of the reasons could be that the 
concept of death among the youth is presumably less developed due to an underlying physical basis, 
namely that the brain’s prefrontal lobe, which inhibits inappropriate behaviour, does not reach its full 
development before mature age (Casey, Tottenham, Liston & Durston 2005). Statistically, there are 
more homicides and crimes against property committed by the youngsters than by the older population 
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(Ferdinand 1970; Steffensmeier, Allen, Harer & Streifel 1989). Also family demography plays a role: 
in larger size families, where there are more youngsters, violence tends to be higher than in small 
families. Hence, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that terrorism and suicide operations are 
phenomena closely associated with youth, and therefore, with populations where the youngsters are 
still the predominant group. Finally, the lumpen youth class, the street idlers who have nothing to do 
because of the high unemployment rate, are tempted by riots, violence and radicalism. Celibacy and 
the huge delays in age at marriage, further create sexual frustration in conservative societies like Arab 
and Muslim societies – but not only there, as the example of Ireland in the nineteenth and the 
beginning of twentieth century shows – which might lead to violent acts. 
 
The main problem with this school of thought is that it considers a rapidly moving reality as static and 
attributes this transient phenomenon to civilizational and religious factors. Arabs and Muslims are 
deemed reluctant to modernize and their demographic behaviour determined forever. The youth bulge, 
the end-result of an ephemeral high or increasing fertility, is considered as an unchanging and intrinsic 
feature of the Arab population. Moreover, the Arab psyche is believed to be reluctant to progress. 
Therefore, these authors are unable to acknowledge the profound diversity among Arab societies. 
Their sole explanation for their behaviour is the common religion. Yet, graphs 6.5 and 6.6 show that 
there were, and still remain, significant differences among Arab and non-Arab countries in the region, 
and that the youth bulge is a transient phase in the demographic transition. Hence, why shouldn’t we 
forecast more peaceful societies, after the political disruption and the Islamist radicalization?  
- Graph 6.5 about here - 
- Graph 6.6 about here - 
 
To investigate the youth bulge in more detail and to look at the potential of the democratic transition, 
we will look at six Arab countries of the Near East: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and 
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Yemen and two from the Maghreb: Morocco and Algeria.
7
  
In only four decades Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria and Turkey will have reached a convergence with 
the developed world in terms of population structure. In 2050, the demographic situation of these more 
advanced Arab/Muslim countries will be similar to that of Europe, North America and Australia with 
12.8% aged 15-24 years and a ratio of the 15-24/ 25-64 of 23.4%. Iran will be even more advanced. 
Yet, these countries underwent severe youth bulges which belong to what we can call the “dark” side 
of the demographic transition. It is an error of the followers of Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, 
however, to consider a historical phase as ever-lasting and determined by the very essence of the Arabs 
or Muslims and their religious beliefs. The peak of the youth bulge belongs to the past in most of these 
countries: 
 Morocco 2000 
 Algeria  2004 
 Syria  2001 
 Lebanon 1976 
 Palestine 2014 
 Egypt  2005 
 Saudi Arabia 1999 
 Iran  2005 
 Turkey  1997 
 Yemen  2011 
 
The demographic projections in graphs 6.5 and 6.6 - based on data from the United Nations - also 
demonstrate that after these difficult phases, the worst is over.  The Arab and Muslim world are 
currently at the heart of the transition to modernity; as we are at the end of the youth bulge and in the 
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middle of a universal process of modernization, a long cycle in which literacy, secularization and then 
declining fertility first highlight the differences between areas, and then lead to a general convergence. 
Some Arab and Muslim countries have already joined Europe by low fertility standards (e.g. Lebanon, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Iran); others are still on the road (like Yemen and Palestine), but their fertility is 
sharply declining. All will have converged with developed regions within a very short time span. 
 
All this demonstrates that there are solid grounds for optimism, regarding the demographic, economic  
and political developments in North Africa and the Middle East. As the youth bulge, the favourite 
scarecrow of the enthusiasts of the clash of civilizations, has started to decrease, the demographic 
transition opens now new avenues. The decreasing pressure on the labour market, mainly due to the 
booming young population, is noteworthy. The reshaping of the age structure, a straightforward result 
of fertility decrease, will accommodate an expansion of the economic growth, and labour productivity 
will be the winner in this shift from quantity to quality. Furthermore, each member of the labour force 
will be in a position to transfer more in cash, or goods, to his or her old parents. This may limit the 
impact of ageing which will probably become an even more serious issue in the Arab countries than it 
is in Europe, because of the suddenness in the growth of the size and share of the cohort of the elderly. 
 
The slowdown of “demographic investments” versus “economic investments” allows the state to turn 
its attention, as an economic actor, to the more directly production-related job-creating sectors. The 
private sector will also win from this demographic transition. The changing age-structure relates to an 
increase in the number of the adults compared to the young people, thus the ratio of producers to 
consumers. The falling fertility rate is generating an expansion of the age-groups with higher 
propensity to save, thus increasing the national saving-rate. 
 
Less visible, but nonetheless very real, is the impact of fertility decline on narrowing the income 
distribution gap. Before the demographic transition started, not only did a smaller share of national 
income go to the poorer workers, but they also had to support larger families. Differential fertility in 
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Arab countries among rich and poor was a significant factor in living standards disparities. The 
reduction of rich/poor fertility gaps is a lever for economic take-off, as we know from the example of 
the Asian tigers (Bloom & Williamson 1998).
8
  
 
Lower wealth disparities and a fairer distribution of knowledge strengthen the middle classes and 
favour pluralism. Therefore, it is not exaggerated to equate the demographic transition to the 
democratic transition.     
 
6.3 The road to democratic transition 
 
The exact timing of the Arab revolutions was largely unforeseen. It is like forecasting an earthquake. 
Seismologists know for sure that a fatal event must happen, but they are completely unable to predict 
when it will occur. The same is true for social scientists or demographers who can forecast on the basis 
of their indices - literacy, urbanization, fertility, marriage, exogamy, youth bulge, unemployment, etc. - 
that something (a revolution? rebellion? upheavals?) has to occur in these countries, but they cannot 
predict when and how. Why has Tunisia paved the way with the first Arab revolution, followed by 
Egypt, where, by all means, the overall situation was much worse? Why later on Libya and Yemen? 
How might the situation in Syria (and Bahrain) evolve, in view of their peculiar demographic 
heterogeneity? 
 
Forty-eight years ago, the Muslim world was viewed by social scientists as a very peculiar reality. 
Dudley Kirk (1966), the renowned American demographer, developed a special set of “laws” for 
Muslim demography: Fertility was universally high, showed no significant trend to decline and was 
believed to remain higher than for believers of other religions. The collapse of fertility in the Arab and 
Muslim regions is a vivid proof of the vacuity of lines of reasoning, as presented by Dudley Kirk. Only 
                                                          
8
 For more details on the forecasted economic effects of Arab demographic transition, see Courbage (2003). 
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essentialists and culturalist thinkers could have thought that the Arab or Muslim world is by nature 
adverse to progress or modernity. However, as underscored in the introduction, comparative history 
enables one to understand that we are in the midst of a universal process, in which the demographic 
transition is a key component that leads societies from literacy to secularization, to contraception and 
ultimately to political revolution. Such processes started in Europe and did not stop at the gates of the 
Arab world.  Here, its development in just four decades is a unique element, yet also an example of the 
acceleration of history.  
 
Going one step further, we infer that if Arabs have adhered to the demographic transition in all its 
phases, including education
9
, contraception and secularization, they are also ready for the long way to 
political revolution and democratization. As we noted already earlier, in-depth transformations at the 
individual level cannot go without a reshuffling of long-established hierarchies, like the absolute 
paternal authority of the father over his children, who are more often better educated than their 
illiterate father. Becoming as educated and sometimes more than their husbands, women are less and 
less supportive of passive submission to the will of their spouses. The same can be said about the 
authority that the brother traditionally holds over his sisters. Hence, the demographic transition led to a 
cascading silent questioning of the once immutable family structure.  
 
But demographic transition is not un long fleuve tranquille
10
 (a bed of rose), dotted with many 
obstacles and multiple risks. One of the risks we alluded to, is derived from the ultimate resistance by 
the patriarchal and “machist” components of these societies. It requires more than a few decades to 
change the nature of the relations among sexes, from male domination to peaceful and quieter 
interactions. The threat hanging over male supremacy explains why the nostalgic Salafist way of 
                                                          
9
 The acquisition of basic education has been an element of the Arab revolutions much more than the so-called 
“new technologies”, including internet, Facebook and Twitter, which were only instrument that spread the 
knowledge and the necessity of the political changes but were not at its roots. In any case, the internet is not 
conceivable without a certain ability to read and write.  
10
 To paraphrase the title of a French movie directed by Etienne Chatillez in 1988. 
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thinking, a return to the mythic perfect society of the beginnings of Islam, seduces some segments of 
the society, now so visible and audible in the landscape: the Islamic veil, the Islamic beard, the 
thundering minarets. All in all, beyond the veil, the beard and the minaret, one has to observe the 
ineluctable progresses of education and contraception. 
 
For the largest parts of the (non-Salafists) population of North Africa and the Middle East, however, 
contraception and delayed age at marriage are now the norms. A small family size, the pattern to which 
the Arab societies are now more and more adhering to, brings about a decrease of pressure on family 
resources and makes the relations among spouses or between parents and children less tense and more 
egalitarian. The pater familias can no longer reign with an iron fist to impose discipline in an 
overcrowded household, cluttered with a dozen of children. All of which cannot but produce a 
beneficial input on the societal and political spheres. Even more what is occurring at the individual and 
family level inevitably will spill over at the societal level. Since after all, society is but the projection 
of the small family level to the large macro-level. The questioning of authority never stops at the micro 
level. The simple person who challenges the authority of his father, will soon contest the legitimacy of 
a President – especially a President for life –, as is the case in Arab countries. 
 
Although this line of reasoning is not that prominent – usually because of the segmentation of social 
sciences: demographers study population matters, political scientists study politics, etc. - it is even less 
common to look how individual and family transformations affect politics,
11
 even if it is the utmost 
futile to detach the changes at the individual and family level from those of the global sphere. Pursuing 
this issue, it is not exaggerated to claim that, although on a world or on the Arab scale there are 
exceptions, a correlation exists between the stage of demographic transition and the stage of 
democracy. In other words, in societies where family size is still of the ancient regime, the odds for 
autocrats or despots to rule are very high. Therefore, the transition of the demographic regime to a 
                                                          
11
 An exception is Valge 2007 
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small family size appears a necessary – although not sufficient – condition to move out of 
authoritarianism on the route to democracy. 
 
Without surprise there are unavoidable gaps between the pace of demographic and political transitions. 
Tunisia, in every respect the most advanced Arab country with regard to literacy, fertility and 
marriage, urbanization, gender-equality, etc., which had on top a religious and ethnic homogeneity, 
had to wait until January 2011 to experience the Jasmine revolution. On the basis of positive indicators 
like the TFR which was not far from 2 since ten years, we could have expected the overthrow of the 
authoritarian regime earlier. At the opposite, Yemen, with the worst demographic (a TFR still as high 
as 5) and socio-economic indicators, far apart from those of Tunisia, could get rid of its autocrat, which 
was in power for some three decades, just a few months after Tunisia. Between those two extremes we 
find Egypt, Libya and Syria, who are at the same stage of their demographic transitions, but are 
experiencing diverging political itineraries. 
 
A paradox of history is that most often it is the political power which lies at the start of the 
modernization process, a process that will prove fatal to its survival. Arab rulers, whose sole objectives 
were and still are to stay in power, have unconsciously sowed the seeds which have prepared their fall. 
In Tunisia where Bourguiba, the first president for life, who would have kept the power for eternity 
before being kicked out by another autocrat, as well as almost everywhere else the process of 
modernization (access to education, to contraception and secularization), has worked in accelerating 
their fall and the emergence of democracy.  Some autocrats were more careful, like the previous king 
of Morocco, Hassan II. After the upheavals in Casablanca in 1965, he was smart enough to foresee that 
universal education could be fatal to his regime and ordered a deceleration of educational progress, 
enabling him to retain his power until his death (Vermeren 2011). In other countries like Syria, 
autocrats sacrificed the quality of education, and with it its modernizing role. So, only with a few 
exceptions, limited to some periods of their history, no Arab country was able to block for good the 
social demand which has fuelled the demographic transition and which will prove to be the death 
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sentence of these regimes.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
To sum up, in all North African and Middle Eastern countries the access to a majority of boys being 
able to read and write, followed by a majority of girls being also able to read and write, has increased 
the level of consciousness of individuals (cf. their individuation), which led secularization going hand 
in hand with contraception, fertility decrease and diminishing family size. All are pre-conditions that 
favour democratic transition. 
 
The common denominator for all these countries is the speed and suddenness of their demographic 
transition; even for the countries lagging behind in their demographic transition, such as Yemen where 
fertility is still very high (five children), the fertility rate nevertheless fell drastically. In 1990 the TFR 
of Yemen was double the value of today. Even in the rich and conservative countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the demographic transition has been particularly speedy. One can wonder if these countries 
(except Bahrain) will remain, thanks to their rental economies, protected forever from the currents of 
Arab upheavals. 
 
People cannot take such a control of their demographic destiny and let others decide their political 
future! 
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 Graph 6.1. Percentage of Arab youngsters (15-19 years) by sex who are able to read and write, 2010   1: 
 
 
Source: National population censuses and demographic surveys providing (il)literacy rates by age and sex 
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Graph 6.2: TFR in the Arab Countries before the fertility transition (1960-1970) and in 2010 
 
 
Source: Calculations based on national data from the World Fertility Survey, Demographic and Health 
Surveys, PAPCHILD, PAPFAM, Gulf Surveys, birth registrations and population censuses. 
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Graph 6.3: Probability (%) to remain sonless by average number of children 
 
 
Source: Own probability calculations based on a sex-ratio at birth of 105 boys to 100 girls 
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Graph 6.4: Enrollment ratio at university level (18-24) by sex and country, around 2010 
 
 
Source: Estimates from national statistical accounts 
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Graph 6.5: The youth bulge and its future in the Maghreb, 1965-2050* 
 
* 2010-2050:Medium variant 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects 2010 
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Graph 6.6: The youth bulge and its future in the Middle East, 1965-2050* 
 
* 2010-2050:Medium variant 
 
Source: United Nations World Population Prospects 2010 
